Promoting and Developing the
Discipline of Operational Risk Management
In common with a number of aspects of operational risk management, risk appetite is an area that attracts differing views among practitioners. One of the reasons for this may be the relative immaturity of the discipline. Another may be the wide variety of contexts e.g. size and structure of organisations, complexity of product/service offerings, regulatory jurisdictions etc.
For these reasons the following summary makes no attempt to suggest a one-size-fits-all solution to any of the practical challenges an organisation faces. Rather, it aims to outline a variety of good practices from which may be drawn a collection of appropriate, relevant and proportional ideas.
| Title: Risk Appetite | Date issued: 01 Dec 2009 |
| Version: 1 | |
| File name: Risk Appetite Sound Practice Guidance V1 | Update date: 01 Dec 2009 |
In common with a number of aspects of operational risk management, risk appetite is an area that attracts differing views among practitioners. One of the reasons for this may be the relative immaturity of the discipline. Another may be the wide variety of contexts e.g. size and structure of organisations, complexity of product/service offerings, regulatory jurisdictions etc.
For these reasons the following summary makes no attempt to suggest a one-size-fits-all solution to any of the practical challenges an organisation faces. Rather, it aims to outline a variety of good practices from which may be drawn a collection of appropriate, relevant and proportional ideas.
Additionally, whilst the focus of this paper is the management of operational risk, it must be recognised that for an organisation to manage its risks holistically there would need to be an understanding of the inter-relationships between different risk types. For instance, it may well be the case that the emergence of an operational risk could precipitate a consequence involving another risk type and the combination could in turn lead to a reputational impact.
An aspect of operational risk appetite that is sometimes lost in the debate about bottom-up and top-down approaches is that operational risk is important to all organisations. It is therefore essential that whatever approach is taken, the Board and senior management are properly engaged in agreeing and monitoring the appetite for operational risk and setting acceptable, and unacceptable, boundaries for business activities and behaviours.
Definitions can vary according to the context: industry sector (e.g. financial services, building, health); stakeholder perspective (e.g. external investors versus internal executive and management); risk type (e.g. operational risk versus credit or market risk).
Suggestions have been published by a wide spectrum of commentators including regulators, industry bodies, consultancies and academic establishments. One of the more generic definitions of risk appetite was published in BS31100: "the amount and type of risk that an organisation is prepared to seek, accept or tolerate."
In theory, accepting any type of risk may carry some aspect of reward but it is important for operational risk practitioners to be aware of the view that this risk type differs from, for example, credit risk and market risk. Operational risks (e.g. IT systems failures or external fraud) may be inherent in operational activities but are rarely intentionally sought and have no material upside in terms of return/income generation. There are, however, cost/benefit decisions involved in defining an appropriate balance between accepting potential losses on the one hand and incurring costs of mitigation on the other (including associated operational inefficiencies that introducing a new control could involve).
Other distinctions are that:
On this basis an organisation's definition of Operational Risk Appetite (ORA), which could be documented explicitly in a statement or within policy or strategy, or implicitly within operational standards, might more accurately be described as the operational risk it is prepared to tolerate.
Whilst the management of risk should be positioned first and foremost as a means of supporting the achievement of company objectives, those are likely to include compliance with regulatory requirements. There has been much published by way of "guidance" (e.g. within the FSA Handbook) which provides a clear indication of the regulatory expectation that firms establish an ORA and that the ORA is likely to provide an important mechanism for demonstrating compliance with "Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls" requirements and the 'use test'. Regulators take a particular interest in risk appetite because of its importance to governance.
In simple terms, expressing ORA is a question of defining what is acceptable to an organisation and what is not. This could be achieved by deciding, for each type of risk, what is acceptable, what is unacceptable, and the parameters of the area between those two i.e. what is tolerable.
It is common practice when monitoring performance against ORA to assign a "RAG" status (Red, Amber, Green). When doing so, the definitions are generally accepted as:
| Status | Meaning | Required action |
| Green | Acceptable | No action required but continue monitoring |
| Amber | Tolerable, but action required to avoid a Red status | Investigate (to verify and understand underlying causes) and consider ways to mitigate / avoid within a specified time period |
| Red | Unacceptable. Urgent attention is required. | Investigate and take steps to mitigate or avoid within a specified short term |
This approach can be applied across the range of operational risk framework components (including risk and control self assessment, internal loss event reporting and scenario analysis) and provides a clear indication of proportional response to the perceived materiality of the associated risk. Specifying a timeframe for resolution can emphasise the perceived urgency and significance of the underlying issue. This makes good business sense and promotes a consistent understanding across the organisation.
From a business perspective there are a number of benefits to be accrued by defining ORA:
All of which can help to enhance performance and thus enhance value to stakeholders.
There are a number of considerations involved in the approach to setting ORA, which can be expressed in a variety of ways e.g. through key risk indicators, risk and control self assessment, losses as well as broad qualitative statements. Good practice might well involve some combination of all the following alternatives.
In the context of sound corporate governance it is clear that ORA must be owned by the Board and established with their full engagement. The remainder of this section deals with the ways in which a comprehensive ORA can be constructed.
Conflicting views have been expressed as to whether operational risk appetite should be set using a top-down or bottom-up approach. A number of surveys of operational risk practitioners (e.g. Marsh and AIRMIC 2009) have reported wide support for a hybrid approach.
In any case it would seem sensible to start with a top-down cascade from the Board (which has an enterprise-wide perspective) in order to set the cultural context for the organisation, to provide a basis for oversight and governance, and to facilitate alignment to strategy. This will often be expressed in qualitative terms but may also include quantitative measures e.g. relationship between expected/unexpected losses and Profit Before Tax.
A number of factors favouring a complementary bottom-up approach, where limits are defined at lower levels in the organisation in line with operational activities, are:
Qualitative expressions of ORA (i.e. without any reference to quantification) can emphasise the relationship between risk and business management. This is often regarded as the best way to describe the attitudes and behaviours of the organisation as a whole – in other words, its "risk culture". This would be achieved through a series of statements, for example:
Sources of reference for qualitative ORA statements can include communications from the CEO and Board (aimed at internal and external audiences), business strategy and policy papers.
Quantitative expressions of ORA, on the other hand, involve hard data, usually having roots in business management information which could be any combination of KPIs (key performance indicators), KRIs (key risk indicators) or KCIs (key control indicators).
Such measures are usually accompanied by thresholds so that it is immediately apparent when a breach has occurred or is imminent. The concept of setting zero thresholds may seem impractical but they can have a cultural purpose in reinforcing the message that it is not appropriate to accept avoidable losses without question.
Examples of quantitative measures include:
By embracing all aspects of the framework (including forward looking as well as historical perspectives), an organisation can establish longer term as well as current/short term ORA settings.
The RAG status described earlier can also be applied to all the foregoing to achieve an aggregate view of past/present/future performance against risk appetite.
The distinction here is that absolute measures are fixed and relative measures are variable, moving in proportion to some other benchmark. For example:
Either/both approaches can be considered more appropriate for different metrics. In many cases a relative measure can be useful to impart a sense of context at the same time as identifying an adverse trend.
A key element of the setting up process is to establish agreed thresholds. These provide specific definitions, for each expression of appetite, of what constitutes "acceptable" becoming "tolerable" or "unacceptable". For qualitative expressions of appetite this could simply be a matter of stating explicitly what is acceptable and what is not.
There are various ways of depicting a distribution curve for operational risk. The following example is for illustrative purposes. Thresholds can be set at any point along the curve of risks from high likelihood low impact to low likelihood high impact, that is:

Note: Setting confidence levels is also an expression of appetite.
Where quantitative data is involved it may be appropriate to express tolerance within a range of values. This may include both positive and negative variance. For example, if a business is monitoring the number of employees, a significant variation above or below the target optimum may be an indication of different kinds of adverse consequence. Too many employees could signal inefficiency, wastage and unnecessarily high costs, whereas too few might lead to failures in procedures and controls or a decline in customer service standards – see illustration below. Being alerted to either possibility is helpful from business and risk perspectives.
| Target no. employees | Amber threshold | Red threshold | Actual | ||||||
| Mth 1 | Mth 2 | Mth 3 | Mth 4 | Mth 5 | Mth 6 | Mth 7 | |||
| 987 | +/- 5% | +/-10% | 989(G) | 935(A) | 964(G) | 996(G) | 1041(A) | 1012(G) | etc |
Identifying the "right" thresholds is ultimately a matter for the respective business line to determine, drawing on practical experience of the context and expected future developments. But the decision can be informed by reference to any relevant data, be it historical or predictive, internal or external (i.e. benchmarking against comparable organisations or industry standards). Even so, if the procedure for review/approval of thresholds is sufficiently flexible, initial attempts can be fine tuned in the light of use in practice. Thresholds should be sufficiently sensitive to provide "early warning" of potential appetite breaches, but not so hypersensitive that alarm bells ring needlessly.
As an example of how historical data could be used as a start point, a review of the previous 12 months' recordings (to account for seasonal fluctuations) could be translated to tolerance thresholds as follows:
If thresholds are set on a bottom-up basis it would be prudent to ensure an appropriate level of governance by means of review and approval by some higher authority (e.g. a Risk Committee). This can achieve a number of benefits:
Once ORA has been defined, documented and communicated to decision makers at all level in the organisation, the focus can turn to the practical application of related procedures.
There would be little practical purpose in defining ORA if the operational reality is not then checked against the defined tolerances. A key aspect of monitoring is the objective to provide early warning of emerging issues and, to be effective as a management tool, it is more than a mechanical procedure, it also requires moderation e.g. arbitration through interpretation.
There are two distinct steps involved in monitoring procedures:
Clearly, monitoring , performance against qualitative statements of ORA is more challenging, but should be attempted to achieve the benefits of early warnings. Often monitoring aspects of the ORA may just provide the focus to ensure that the right conversation takes place. The value of this should not be underestimated.
One of the challenges in aggregating upward-flowing information is the potential for distortion or misrepresentation. A "Red" status in a small business unit may be of little or no significance to the Group Board and there is a danger that the meaning and value of the "unacceptable" flag will become diluted. On the other hand it would be completely inappropriate for the business unit to simply adopt group level tolerances – because then everything would be perpetually "Green" and apparently require no attention whatsoever.
One solution is to construct a conversion table (based perhaps on business scale criteria) so that a business unit Red will always be so locally, but in reporting through successive layers of senior management will become "Amber" or even "Green" to provide more accurately a sense of proportion in the changing context in which it is viewed. For example:
| Risk: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Business RAG | R | A | A | R | A | R | R | A |
| Business A = 80% of Division X | Business B = 20% of Division X | Business C = 20% of Division Y | Business D = 80% of Division Y | |||||
| Division RAG | R | A | G | A | G | A | R | A |
| Division X = 80% of Group | Division Y = 20% of Group | |||||||
| Group RAG | R | A | G | A | G | G | A | G |
From a Group perspective, the most significant risk is Risk 1, in the largest business of the largest division. But at business unit level all high risks (Red) – the most significant locally - would receive an appropriate level of attention.
A second point about reporting appetite-related information is the need to be clear about the objective, which could be one or more of the following:
It is important to ensure that reporting of ORA information is not perceived as a vehicle for presenting too optimistic an interpretation of positions and trends. The real value is the provision of early warnings which can encourage timely management intervention and action to avert emerging issues.
Last and by no means least is where ORA processes and procedures reach a logical and meaningful conclusion – the point at which business and risk management is exercised.
"Ambers" and "reds" have to drive action of some kind and the decision to be reached is a choice between:
In each case the business, risk and regulatory expectations will be met. The organisation's senior management will be aware, be informed and be involved in the decision making process. It should then be a straightforward matter to assemble evidence of such activity to demonstrate adherence to the "Use Test".

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